CS70: Lecture 9. Outline.

- 1. Public Key Cryptography
- 2. RSA system
 - 2.1 Efficiency: Repeated Squaring.
 - 2.2 Correctness: Fermat's Theorem.
 - 2.3 Construction.
- 3. Warnings.

Bijection:

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$$f(x) = ax \pmod{m}$$
 if $gcd(a, m) = 1$.

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What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

Try $43 + 22 = 65 = 20 \pmod{45}$.

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the actions under (mod 5), (mod 9) correspond to actions in (mod 45)!

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x = 5 \mod 7 and x = 5 \mod 6

y = 4 \mod 7 and y = 3 \mod 6
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What's true?

$$x = 5 \mod 7$$
 and $x = 5 \mod 6$
 $y = 4 \mod 7$ and $y = 3 \mod 6$

What's true?

- (A) $x + y = 2 \mod 7$
- (B) $x + y = 2 \mod 6$
- (C) $xy = 3 \mod 6$
- (D) $xy = 6 \mod 7$
- (E) $x = 5 \mod 42$
- (F) $y = 39 \mod 42$

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All true.

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Note: Also modular addition modulo 2!

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Property: $A \oplus B \oplus B = A$.

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Property: $A \oplus B \oplus B = A$. By cases: $1 \oplus 1 \oplus 1 = 1$.

Xor


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
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












Example:



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One-time Pad: secret s is string of length |m|.



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 $s = \dots$



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Uses up one time pad..



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Disadvantages:

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Uses up one time pad..or less and less secure.














$$m = D(E(m, K), k)$$


Private: k

Public: K

Message m


Eve






Everyone knows key K! Bob (and Eve

Bob (and Eve and me





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
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Is this even possible?

Is public key crypto possible?

¹Typically small, say e = 3.

We don't really know.

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Announce $N(=p \cdot q)$ and e: K = (N, e) is my public key!

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Compute $a = e \mod (p-1)(q-1)$.

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Encoding: $mod(x^e, N)$.

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Does $D(E(m)) = m^{ed} = m \mod N$?

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Poll

What is a piece of RSA?

Bob has a key (N,e,d). Alice is good, Eve is evil.

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What is a piece of RSA?

Bob has a key (N,e,d). Alice is good, Eve is evil.

- (A) Eve knows e and N.
- (B) Alice knows e and N.
- (C) $ed = 1 \pmod{N-1}$
- (D) Bob forgot p and q but can still decode?
- (E) Bob knows d
- (F) $ed = 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$ if N = pq.

Poll

What is a piece of RSA?

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Example: p = 7, q = 11.

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 $d = e^{-1} = -17 = 43 = \pmod{60}$

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Message: 2!

E(2)

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$$E(2) = 2^e$$

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51⁴³

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Decoding got the message back!

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Repeated Squaring took 9 multiplications
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```
(define (power x y m)
  (if (= y 1)
    (mod x m)
    (let ((x-to-evened-y (power (square x) (/ y 2) m)))
    (if (evenp y)
        x-to-evened-v
         (mod (* x x-to-evened-y) m)))))
Claim: Program correctly computes x^y.
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Note: $y = 2|y/2| + \mod(y,2)$.

$$x^y = x^{2(\lfloor y/2 \rfloor) + \mod (y,2)} = (x^2)^{\lfloor y/2 \rfloor} x^{y \mod 2} \pmod{m}.$$

Induction:

Recursive call on x^2 and $\lfloor y/2 \rfloor$, returns $(x^2)^{\lfloor y/2 \rfloor}$.

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 \leq 2 multiplications per recursive call.

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Note: |y/2| is integer division.

Repeated squaring $O(\log y)$ multiplications versus y!!!

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Repeated squaring $O(\log y)$ multiplications versus y!!!

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Repeated squaring $O(\log y)$ multiplications versus y!!!

1. x^y : Compute x^1, x^2, x^4 ,

Repeated squaring $O(\log y)$ multiplications versus y!!!

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Repeated squaring $O(\log y)$ multiplications versus y!!!

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- 1. x^{y} : Compute $x^{1}, x^{2}, x^{4}, ..., x^{2^{\lfloor \log y \rfloor}}$.
- 2. Multiply together x^i where the $(\log(i))$ th bit of y (in binary) is 1.

- 1. x^{y} : Compute $x^{1}, x^{2}, x^{4}, ..., x^{2^{\lfloor \log y \rfloor}}$.
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Repeated squaring $O(\log y)$ multiplications versus y!!!

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Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$.

Repeated squaring $O(\log y)$ multiplications versus y!!!

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Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$. All *n*-bit numbers. Repeated Squaring:

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Conclusion: $x^y \mod N$

Repeated squaring $O(\log y)$ multiplications versus y!!!

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Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$. All *n*-bit numbers. Repeated Squaring:

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Conclusion: $x^y \mod N$ takes $O(n^3)$ time.

Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$.

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Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$. All n-bit numbers. $O(n^3)$ time.

$$E(m,(N,e)) = m^e \pmod{N}$$
.

Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$. All n-bit numbers. $O(n^3)$ time.

$$E(m,(N,e)) = m^e \pmod{N}.$$

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Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$. All n-bit numbers. $O(n^3)$ time.

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Similar, not same, but useful.

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(A) 2^7 = 1 \mod 7
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(B)
$$2^6 = 1 \mod 7$$

- (C) $2^1, 2^2, 2^3, 2^4, 2^5, 2^6, 2^7$ are distinct mod 7.
- (D) $2^{1}, 2^{2}, 2^{3}, 2^{4}, 2^{5}, 2^{6}$ are distinct mod 7
- (E) $2^15 = 2 \mod 7$
- $(F) 2^1 5 = 1 \mod 7$

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...Decoding correctness...

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From CRT: $y = x \pmod{p}$ and $y = x \pmod{q} \implies y = x$.

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Recall

$$D(E(x)) = (x^e)^d = x^{ed} \pmod{pq},$$

where $ed \equiv 1 \mod (p-1)(q-1) \implies ed = 1 + k(p-1)(q-1)$

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1. Find large (100 digit) primes *p* and *q*?

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Prime Number Theorem: $\pi(N)$ number of primes less than N.For all $N \geq 17$

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Choosing randomly gives approximately $1/(\ln N)$ chance of number being a prime. (How do you tell if it is prime?

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All steps are polynomial in $O(\log N)$, the number of bits.

Security?

- 1. Alice knows p and q.
- 2. Bob only knows, N(=pq), and e.

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CS161...

Verisign:

Amazon ← Browser.

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Certificate Authority: Verisign, GoDaddy, DigiNotar,...

Verisign: k_{ν} , K_{ν}

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Verisign's key: $K_V = (N, e)$ and $k_V = d$ (N = pq)

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Versign signature of $C: S_v(C): D(C, k_V) = C^d \mod N$.

```
[C, S_{\nu}(C)]
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Amazon \longleftrightarrow Browser. K_{\nu}
```


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Verisign:
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$$[C, S_V(C)]$$

$$C = E(S_V(C), k_V)?$$

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Valid signature of Amazon certificate C!

Security: Eve can't forge unless she "breaks" RSA scheme.

Public Key Cryptography:

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$$D(E(m,K),k) = (m^e)^d \mod N = m.$$

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Signature scheme:

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Signature scheme:

$$E(D(C,k),K) = (C^d)^e \mod N = C$$

Poll

Signature authority has public key (N,e).

Poll


Signature authority has public key (N,e).

- (A) Given message/signature (x,y): check $y^d = x \pmod{N}$
- (B) Given message/signature (x, y): check $y^e = x \pmod{N}$
- (C) Signature of message x is $x^e \pmod{N}$
- (D) Signature of message x is $x^d \pmod{N}$

Poll

Signature authority has public key (N,e).

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Other Eve.

Get CA to certify fake certificates: Microsoft Corporation.

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How does Microsoft get a CA to issue certificate to them ...

and only them?

Public-Key Encryption.

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RSA Scheme:

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$$N = pq$$
 and $d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$.
 $E(x) = x^e \pmod{N}$.

$$E(X) = X^{e} \pmod{N}$$
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$$D(y) = y^d \pmod{N}$$
.

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Repeated Squaring \implies efficiency.

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